Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States


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As management of the resource revenues is becoming even more urgent, many resource-rich countries are setting up mineral funds and other state investment vehicles to tackle the management challenge. This issue is elaborated by Matthias Luecke in the second paper of the Symposium. Countries with large mineral resources can benefit from appropriate government decisions on investment.

Historically, the stimulus for establishing mineral funds was the realization that many oil-rich countries wasted the windfall benefits from their resources.

In This Review

The inception of the mineral funds and their early history produced several lessons. In principle, mineral funds could facilitate domestic investments with high social return that are otherwise underprovided by market forces. In addition, resource funds are likely to be socially beneficial only if they are well managed.

The economic performance of many resource rich countries has been disappointing, even to the extent of prompting some observers to ask whether natural resources are a blessing or a curse. For example, about two-thirds of Caspian economies are driven by the oil and gas industry and state spending Kalyuzhnova, State spending is highly dependent on revenues from the hydrocarbon sector.

Resource rich emerging countries of Eurasia might face new economic challenges if their natural resources industry and state spending stop growing or decline. Mineral wealth, and state spending, may thus be mixed economic blessings for these economies. Whether a particular stabilization and savings fund is effective in accumulating assets for the medium and long run thus depends on whether its rules of operation are i appropriate and ii also followed in practice. Against this background, the paper by Matthias Luecke assesses the rules and operation of the stabilization and savings funds in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, comparing them with the Norwegian experience.

Drawing on the experience of Russia and Kazakhstan they illustrate how, in the absence of well functioning private financial sector, the governments of these two countries have attempted to substitute for the absence of the latter by introducing special vehicles that channel and direct resource revenues from their respective SWFs.

In the paper the authors argue that these structures — Samruk-Kazyna of Kazakhstan and Vnesheconombank of Russia — retain significant elements of economic direction rather than market coordination. Through this analysis, Kalyuzhnova and Nygaard question the effectiveness of these establishments as long-term instruments for overcoming dependence on natural resources and immature financial sectors.

The paper distinguishes between crisis and systemic components of these vehicles. There is a connection between resource nationalism and government intervention in the financial sector.

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In the environment of high oil prices there is a possibility of spreading resource nationalism to other sectors of the economy. Resource nationalism could trigger state intervention in the financial sector. To some extent this might be conditioned by a general weakness of market institutions. The latter weakness is endogenous to the transition process.

Oil is not a curse: Ownership structure and institutions in soviet successor states

State-owned investment vehicles constitute additional market imperfections in that they may direct investment on the basis of non-economic considerations. In any given economy some investments are carried out on the basis of non-economic considerations equity, redistribution etc. Overall, Kazakhstan and Russia represent cases with commonalities, but also differences. Common to both countries has been the successful usage of resource funds during the recent crisis in order to stabilize the economy and the inception and use of special vehicles for state intervention during and after the crisis.

Athenaeum Fortnightly - Volume 26, Issue 06, Article 3 | Claremont McKenna College

Prior to the crisis, resource revenues in Russia and Kazakhstan enabled direct and indirect credit growth in the form of state bank credits to the economy; budgetary credits to the domestic markets for the industries and consumers, and domestic operations of sovereign wealth funds. However, whereas Samruk-Kazyna's overall weight in the economy is considerable, Vneshekonombank is one of a number of state-owned financial institutions.

However, unlike other state-owned banks, Vneshekonombank has a clear industrial policy remit and functions outside the Central Bank of Russia's regulatory framework. In the globalized economy the confluence of politics and economics is clearly expressed in energy. In Eurasia oil, and gas revenues have been significant drivers of credit expansion in recent years through a number of direct and indirect routes. At a more general level, the inflow of oil and gas revenue in Eurasia has promoted nationalist economic structures via financial market intervention.

However, the rapid credit expansion in recent years has not concomitantly led to a comparable expansion of investments, an issue that is compounded by structural weaknesses in the banking and credit system that, partially, necessitate the development of the dedicated state-owned investment vehicles discussed in this symposium. In the paper the authors argue that these structures — Samruk-Kazyna of Kazakhstan and Vnesheconombank of Russia — retain significant elements of economic direction rather than market coordination.

Through this analysis, Kalyuzhnova and Nygaard question the effectiveness of these establishments as long-term instruments for overcoming dependence on natural resources and immature financial sectors.

The Cold War - The Terrible History of ‘Hobbesian Traps’?

The paper distinguishes between crisis and systemic components of these vehicles. There is a connection between resource nationalism and government intervention in the financial sector. In the environment of high oil prices there is a possibility of spreading resource nationalism to other sectors of the economy. Resource nationalism could trigger state intervention in the financial sector.

To some extent this might be conditioned by a general weakness of market institutions. The latter weakness is endogenous to the transition process. State-owned investment vehicles constitute additional market imperfections in that they may direct investment on the basis of non-economic considerations. In any given economy some investments are carried out on the basis of non-economic considerations equity, redistribution etc.

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Overall, Kazakhstan and Russia represent cases with commonalities, but also differences. Common to both countries has been the successful usage of resource funds during the recent crisis in order to stabilize the economy and the inception and use of special vehicles for state intervention during and after the crisis.

Prior to the crisis, resource revenues in Russia and Kazakhstan enabled direct and indirect credit growth in the form of state bank credits to the economy; budgetary credits to the domestic markets for the industries and consumers, and domestic operations of sovereign wealth funds. However, whereas Samruk-Kazyna's overall weight in the economy is considerable, Vneshekonombank is one of a number of state-owned financial institutions. However, unlike other state-owned banks, Vneshekonombank has a clear industrial policy remit and functions outside the Central Bank of Russia's regulatory framework.

In the globalized economy the confluence of politics and economics is clearly expressed in energy. In Eurasia oil, and gas revenues have been significant drivers of credit expansion in recent years through a number of direct and indirect routes. At a more general level, the inflow of oil and gas revenue in Eurasia has promoted nationalist economic structures via financial market intervention.


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However, the rapid credit expansion in recent years has not concomitantly led to a comparable expansion of investments, an issue that is compounded by structural weaknesses in the banking and credit system that, partially, necessitate the development of the dedicated state-owned investment vehicles discussed in this symposium. Skip to main content. Advertisement Hide. Download PDF. Symposium Introduction First Online: 09 December Goldsworthy, B and Zakharova, D. Google Scholar. Heuty, A and Aristi, J. Middlebury College Economics Discussion paper no.

iitraangn.in/967-phone-monitoring.php Jones Luong, P and Weinthal, E. Annual Review of Political Science 9: — Cambridge University Press: New York. CrossRef Google Scholar. Kalyuzhnova, Y. Comparative Economic Studies — Public Finance Monitoring Center, mimeo.

Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States
Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States
Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States
Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States
Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States
Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States
Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States

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